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Iraq needs a strongman
By: Daniel Pipes
Published date: 10/6/2003
As even President Bush has acknowledged, building democracy in Iraq will be a long and slow process: "The work of building a new Iraq will take time. That nation is recovering not just from weeks of conflict, but from decades of totalitarian rule."
There's plenty of evidence to back up this caution. Thousands of Iraqi Shia in Karbala celebrated 'Ashura chanting "No to America, No to Saddam, Yes to Islam"; thousands others marched in Baghdad with signs like "No to the foreign administration" and carried pictures of Iran's Ayatollah Khomeini.
Sunnis in Falluja made their enmity to what some of them call a "humiliating occupation" or even a "new dictatorship" clearly known by attacking coalition forces.
These sentiments have ominous implications for the coalition forces. Gratitude for liberation usually has a short shelf-life, and Iraq will be no exception. As a middle-aged factory manager put it, "Thank you, Americans. But now we don't need anybody to stay here anymore."
However delighted they are to be rid of the Saddamite nightmare, Iraqis mentally live in a world of conspiracy theories, causing many to harbor deep suspicions of coalition intentions.
"Yes to Islam" in effect means "Yes to Iranian-style militant Islam." The introduction of that failed system would be a disaster for Iraq and would revive the Khomeini message, which by now has lost nearly all appeal in Iran.
This state of affairs leaves coalition forces in a bind: as vanquishers of the Saddam Hussein regime, they aim to rehabilitate the country, which means sticking around. As liberator of the country, they must respond to Iraqi wishes, which means getting out fast.
What to do? If coalition forces leave Iraq precipitously, anarchy and extremism result. Stay too long, they face an anti-imperialist backlash of sabotage and terrorism. Hold elections too fast, the Khomeini-like mullahs will probably win. Keep the country under an occupation force, an intifada rears up.
The dilemma was summed up by David Manning, foreign policy adviser to Britain's Prime Minister Tony Blair:
"We want to be partners, and we want to leave just as soon as we can. But we cannot do that unless we leave behind structures that are worthy of you and that are properly assembled."
The US and UK governments need to square the circle - put the country to right while getting out of the way, bring about a democracy without letting the Iranians take over. I offer two pieces of advice:
Plan for the long haul. Building a full democracy (meaning, regularly voting the head of government out of office) takes time. From the Magna Carta in 1215 to the Reform Act of 1832, England needed six centuries. The United States needed over a century. Things have sped up these days, but it still takes twenty or more years to reach full democracy. That was the timetable in countries as varied as South Korea, Chile, Poland, and Turkey.
Plan for a gradual transition. A population emerging from thirty years in the dungeon cannot cope with all the choices of full democracy, but must get there in steps. Democratically-minded autocrats can guide the country to full democracy better than snap elections.
Therefore: Iraq needs - and I write these words with some trepidation - a democratically-minded Iraqi strongman who has real authority. Placing the words "democratically-minded" and "strongman" may sound like a contradiction but it has happened elsewhere, for example by Atat¸rk in Turkey and Chiang Kai-shek on Taiwan. Yes, it goes against every American instinct. "Democracy Now!" is the name of a national radio show, but that's not a reason to reject it. Democracy is a learned habit, not instinct. The infrastructure of a civil society - such as freedom of speech, freedom of movement, freedom of assembly, the rule of law, minority rights, and an independent judiciary - needs to be established before holding elections. Deep attitudinal changes must take place as well: a culture of restraint, a commonality of values, a respect for differences of view, and a sense of civic responsibility.
As an analysis in The Los Angeles Times put it: democratic values have been a thousand years in the making. No doubt Iraq's Shia majority is happy at Hussein's downfall, but American lectures on the virtues of replacing him with democratic rule fall on uncomprehending ears. So much must first be done to lay a groundwork of individual freedom and responsibility, values that Iraqis must willingly embrace.
In other words, it will be years before democratic institutions and views will prosper in Iraq. In the meantime, elections should begin on the local level. The press should inch toward full freedom, political parties grow organically, parliament gain in authority. The Shia can develop democratic ideas, uninfluenced by Khomeinism.
Others are coming around to this conclusion too. Juan Williams of National Public Radio has said, "It looks to me and it's hard to say, but you got to have a strong hand here. … it looks right now as if you need a very strong, capable hand saying, this is what's going to happen here right now. … you've got to keep Syria and you've got to keep Iran at bay to allow some kind of democratic function to take place so you can have an election. But I think you've got to help people along. It's been 30 long years with Saddam Hussein and that Baath Party rule."
Who should fill the all-important role of strongman? The ideal candidate would be politically moderate but operationally tough, someone with an ambition to steer Iraq toward democracy and good neighborly relations.
As for the coalition forces, after installing a strongman they should phase out their visible role and pull back to a few military bases away from population centers. From these, they can quietly serve as the military partner of the new government, guaranteeing its ultimate security and serving as a constructive influence for the entire region.
The approach outlined here undercuts the rage of anti-imperialism, finesses the almost certain violence against coalition troops, and prevents the Iranians from colonizing Iraq.
Trouble is, news coming from Iraq suggests the coalition authorities are taking their time. One of the first moves by Paul Bremer, the coalition's second chief administrator, was to delay a national conference to choose an Iraqi authority until mid-July, rather than late May, as his predecessor, Jay M. Garner, had planned.
As time goes on, the powers of the Iraqi authority appear to be diminishing, with the implication now that it will report to Bremer.
It appears that the US government has lost faith in its former ally, the Iraqi opponents to Saddam Hussein, and has concluded that Americans must remain in charge to keep order and put together a recovery package.
Iraqi disappointment to this development has been severe. Large demonstrations of Shia have called for an interim government run by Iraqis. At a meeting of political leaders in late May with a coalition representative, The New York Times reported "Several speakers warned that the allies, in delaying the formation of an Iraqi government, would provide ammunition to former Baath Party supporters of (Saddam) Hussein."
The window of opportunity is closing rapidly; unless the coalition transfers power to Iraqis very soon, preferably a democratically-minded strongman, it cannot achieve its ambitious goals.
Daniel Pipes is director of the Middle East Forum and a columnist and author. US President George Bush recently nominated him to the board of the US Institute of Peace, a Congressionally sponsored think tank.
Published date: 10/6/2003
Author: Daniel Pipes
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